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MICROSOFT-NOKIA MERGER CONTROL IN EAST 
ASIA 
By Luke Hung-Yu Chuang1and Shih-Wei Chao2 
This article discusses the Microsoft–Nokia merger control case 
to illustrate the varying approaches taken by the antitrust 
authorities of China, South Korea, and Taiwan to mitigate the 
anticompetitive effect potentially arising from Microsoft’s 
acquisition of Nokia’s business unit. Unlike regulators in the 
United States and the European Union, those in these Asian 
countries took into consideration the possible harm to their 
respective local industries from the acquisition and imposed 
restrictions on the respective abilities of Microsoft and Nokia to 
enforce their patents. The Microsoft–Nokia case demonstrates 
that different antitrust regimes exist among Asian countries as 
well as between regions of the globe.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In September 2013, Microsoft announced it would acquire most 
of Nokia’s Devices and Services Business (“DSB”), including the 
design team, manufacturing capacity, marketing support, and 
approximately 8,500 design patents. 3  Nokia also agreed to grant 
Microsoft a 10-year nonexclusive license to its patent portfolio with the 
option of making it permanent.4 At the time, Microsoft was the clear 
leader in the world’s computer operating system market.5 Nokia had 
also been a renowned mobile phone enterprise for the past two decades. 
The purpose of Microsoft’s acquisition of Nokia’s assets was to help 
Microsoft officially enter the smartphone market, in which Nokia was 
no longer competitive; the asset acquisition could help Microsoft bring 
its own smartphone and mobile operating system to market. 6 
Microsoft’s aspiration was to transform into a competitive smartphone 
manufacturer by combining Nokia’s device design and manufacturing 
capability with its own Windows Phone operating system.7  
This vertical integration did not go to plan. 8  Despite the 
significant boost from this acquisition and investment, Windows Phone 
as a mobile operating system never became successful, and Microsoft 
was unable to achieve a smartphone market share on par with that of 
 
3 John “Jay” A. Jurata, Jr. & Inessa Mirkin Owens, A New Trade War: 
Applying Domestic Antitrust Laws to Foreign Patents, 22 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 1127, 1138–39 (2015). 
4 Microsoft to Acquire Nokia’s Devices & Services Business, License Nokia’s 
Patents and Mapping Services, MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER (Sept. 3, 2013), 
https://news.microsoft.com/2013/09/03/microsoft-to-acquire-nokias-devices-
services-business-license-nokias-patents-and-mapping-services/.  
5 Ed Bott, Latest OS Share Data Shows Windows still Dominating in PCs, 
ZDNET: THE ED BOTT REPORT (Apr. 1, 2013, 16:15), 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/latest-os-share-data-shows-windows-still-
dominating-in-pcs/. 
6 See Microsoft, Nokia Devices and Services Business Aim to Remake Mobile 
Market, MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER (Apr. 25, 2014), 
https://news.microsoft.com/2014/04/25/microsoft-nokia-devices-and-
services-business-aim-to-remake-mobile-market-2 (“The completion of 
Nokia Devices and Services business acquisition April 25 will enable 
Microsoft to accelerate its share of smartphones and feature phones in 
developed and emerging markets, and increases its role as a devices and 
services company.”).  
7 See James Vincent, Four Reasons Why Microsoft Had to Buy Nokia, THE 
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 3, 2013, 15:19), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/features/four-reasons-why-microsoft-had-to-buy-
nokia-8796638.html. 
8 See Tom Warren, Microsoft Wasted at least $8 Billion on Its Failed Nokia 
Experiment, THE VERGE (May 25, 2016, 5:20 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2016/5/25/11766540/microsoft-nokia-acquisition-
costs. 
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Apple or Samsung. 9  Microsoft eventually sold Nokia’s DSB to 
Foxconn and HMD Global.10 
Microsoft’s acquisition was not a successful business strategy, but 
the case is useful for the insights it offers to the comparative study of 
merger control and antitrust law in general. When major multinational 
corporations (“MNCs”) such as Microsoft and Nokia engage in 
mergers and acquisitions (“M&As”), they are typically required to 
notify the antitrust authorities of countries in which they operate and 
refrain from completing the transaction until such authorities have 
finished examining the potential effects on economies and markets they 
represent.11 In some cases, the authorities intervene, but the extent to 
which they do so varies considerably; intervention is much more likely 
when the industry is a sensitive one, such as the development and 
manufacture of smartphones or other high-tech products. 12  Factors 
such as the country’s economic status, position in the global market, 
and whether the country hosts prominent businesses determine the ease 
with which regulatory approval is granted for a proposed M&A.13 
Approval of some deals may be contingent upon certain conditions; in 
such cases, regulators may require the participating companies to agree 
to certain limitations on their business operations (known as 
“behavioral injunctions”) or agree to relinquish certain assets (known 
as “structural remedies”). 14  These conditions are not meant to be 
detrimental to merging companies but are rather aimed at preserving 
 
9 See Roger Cheng, Microsoft may have just Killed Its Lumia Line. Good 
Riddance, CNET (May 18, 2016, 8:34 AM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/microsoft-may-have-just-killed-its-lumia-line-
good-riddance/. 
10 Microsoft Selling Feature Phone Business to FIH Mobile Ltd. and HMD 
Global, Oy, MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER (May 18, 2016), 
https://news.microsoft.com/2016/05/18/microsoft-selling-feature-phone-
business-to-fih-mobile-ltd-and-hmd-global-oy/.  
11 See Ilene Knable Gotts & Sarah E. Strasser, International Pre-Merger 
Notification Requirements, in ALI-ABA’S PRACTICE CHECK MANUAL ON 
ADVISING BUSINESS CLIENTS II: CHECKLISTS FORMS AND ADVICE FOR THE 
PRACTICAL LAWYER 305, 305 (American Law Institute, 2000).  
12 See W. Adam Hunt, Business Implications of Divergences in Multi-
Jurisdictional Merger Review by International Competition Enforcement 
Agencies, 28 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 147, 147–48 (2007); See also Keke 
Feng, Patent-Related Mergers and Market Definition Under the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines: The Need to Consider Technology and 
Innovation Markets, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 197, 197–202 (2011). 
13 D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1055, 1103–04 (2010). 
14 Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network 
Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15 (2001). 
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market competition and, in some cases, safeguarding the national 
economy and industry.  
Seeking clearance of the proposed acquisition, Microsoft and 
Nokia filed merger notifications in numerous countries and regions.15 
Both the United States (“US”) and European Union (“EU”) promptly 
approved the merger without any conditions or restrictions.16 Russia, 
India, Turkey, and Israel also gave such unconditional approval. 17 
However, the case was rather different in East Asia, namely in China, 
South Korea, and Taiwan, which are home to many of Microsoft and 
Nokia’s allies and adversaries.18 The antitrust authorities in these East 
Asian countries took significantly longer to investigate the proposed 
acquisition and make their decisions, and the decisions were less 
friendly to the companies.19  
The US and EU decisions were respectively announced in late 
November and early December 2013.20 In the US, merger control cases 
 
15 See Tim Ferguson, Microsoft-Nokia Deal Clears European Regulatory 
Hurdle, MOBILE WORLD LIVE (Dec. 5, 2013), 
https://www.mobileworldlive.com/featured-content/top-three/microsoft-
nokia-deal-clear-final-regulatory-hurdle/. 




17 Id.; Foo Yun Chee, Microsoft to Win EU okay for $7.3 Billion Nokia Deal: 
Sources, REUTERS (Nov. 22, 2013, 9:30 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-nokia-eu/microsoft-to-win-eu-
okay-for-7-3-billion-nokia-deal-sources-idUSBRE9AL0V320131122.  
18 Already the world’s largest smartphone market in 2013, China was home 
to some of the biggest smartphone brands at the time, including Xiaomi, 
Huawei and Lenovo. Even Apple, the most profitable smartphone company 
in the world, has its phones assembled in China. South Korea is home to the 
famous brands Samsung and LG and is well-known for its economic reliance 
on the high-tech sector, particularly smartphone and component 
manufacturing. Taiwan’s HTC was in its prime around 2013, leading the 
Taiwanese smartphone industry. See Gartner Says Annual Smartphone Sales 
Surpassed Sales of Feature Phones for the First Time in 2013, GARTNER 
(Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2014-
02-13-gartner-says-annual-smartphone-sales-surpassed-sales-of-feature-
phones-for-the-first-time-in-2013. See also Research and Markets: The 
Chinese Smartphone Industry: 2013 – 2014, BUSINESS WIRE (Apr. 25, 2014, 
7:00 AM), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140425005246/en/Research-
Markets-Chinese-Smartphone-Industry-2013--.   
19 See Kim Yoo-chul, FTC Conditionally Approves Microsoft-Nokia Deal, 
THE KOREA TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015, 19:32), 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/2015/02/133_173064.html. 
20 U.S. Approves Microsoft Purchase of Nokia's Mobile Business, REUTERS 
(Dec. 2, 2013, 12:27 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nokia-
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are decided by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”).21 They approved via grant of early 
termination but did not disclose much more than the decision itself.22 
Thus, it is unclear to what extent they investigated the competitive 
effect of the proposed acquisition. By contrast, the European 
Commission (“EC”), the authority in charge of EU merger control, 
released a much more thoroughly detailed decision.23 Its investigation 
results indicated that Microsoft’s products did not have a large enough 
market share to be considered competitors with major players in the 
industry, Android and iOS.24 The EC further argued that Nokia should 
not even be included in the competition investigation based on how EU 
merger control is designed.25 The US and EU both moved quickly in 
 
microsoft-antitrust/u-s-approves-microsoft-purchase-of-nokias-mobile-
business-idUSBRE9B10TY20131202 [hereinafter U.S. Approves]; EU 
Commission Approves Microsoft Takeover of Nokia Business; REUTERS 
(Dec. 4, 2013, 8:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-
commission-microsoft-nokia/eu-commission-approves-microsoft-takeover-
of-nokia-business-idUSBRE9B30SP20131204 [hereinafter EU 
Commission]. 
21 The Hart–Scott–Rodino Act of 1976 amended the Clayton Antitrust Act to 
include a premerger notification program, which requires corporations to 
notify the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ in advance of any 
mergers or acquisitions. See Premerger Notification Program, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (last visited June 18, 2020), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program. After 
notification, such deals enter a waiting period during which the government 
reviews them. If a certain M&A transaction poses a threat to the market and 
consumers, the FTC and DOJ may interfere through formal legal action. 
Otherwise deal closure is permitted after the waiting period (outlined in the 
Hart–Scott–Rodino Act) terminates. In some cases, the government may find 
a transaction to be harmless competition-wise and will thus grant early 
termination of the waiting period, tantamount to early approval. See also 
Merger Review, FED. TRADE COMM’N (last visited June 18, 2020), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/merger-review.  
22 Granting of Request for Early Termination of the Waiting Period Under 
the Premerger Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 76146–48 (Dec. 16, 2013).  
23 See Case COMP/M.7047 - Microsoft/Nokia, 2013 O.J. (C. 8873) 1, 8–9 
[hereinafter EC Decision].  
24 The Commission concluded that after acquiring Nokia’s DSB, Microsoft’s 
market share would still be too insignificant to represent a risk of 
monopolization. This was true for all of Microsoft’s products and assets, 
including its Windows Phone operating system, its Office program and other 
productivity apps, and its patents regarding the data synchronization protocol 
named Exchange ActiveSync (“EAS”). Id. paras. 102–03, 137–38, 164. 
25 Id. paras. 252–63. The EC was hesitant to include Nokia in this case’s 
competition investigation, stating that since the “merged entity” consisted of 
only Microsoft and the acquired Nokia division, the remainder of Nokia fell 
outside the Merger Regulation’s scope. The EC nevertheless reasoned as if 
Nokia were subject to the investigation. The EC concluded that Nokia’s 
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clearing the acquisition, declining to place any sort of conditions on 
Microsoft and Nokia.26  
By contrast, the authorities in China, South Korea, and Taiwan 
were more circumspect in their decision-making. All three ultimately 
opted to grant approval for the merger on a conditional basis between 
early 2014 and mid-2015. 27  Most of the conditions imposed on 
Microsoft involved its standard essential patents (“SEPs”) and 
nonstandard essential patents (non-SEPs).28 Microsoft’s ability to seek 
injunctive relief against domestic companies was restricted, thereby 
blocking a crucial strategy in patent enforcement and litigation. 29 
Limitations were also imposed on Microsoft’s freedom to charge future 
licensees a higher royalty rate or impose other unfavorable license 
terms. 30  For Nokia, while regulators in China, South Korea, and 
Taiwan focused on its numerous telecommunication SEPs, they did not 
uniformly impose conditions on Nokia.31 
 
standard essential patents (“SEPs”) were already subject to fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) commitments made to standard setting 
organizations (“SSOs”) and most of them were already in-license 
agreements, which Nokia could not readily alter the fees and terms of. 
Nokia’s non-SEPs, on the other hand, did not constitute a portfolio too 
extensive to design around, and their enforcement efforts were not merger-
specific in the sense that, even before the merger, these patents were already 
being used by Nokia to seek injunctions and to sue for infringement.  
26 U.S. Approves, supra note 20; EU Commission, supra note 20. 
27 See Jung Suk-yee, Korea Fair Trade Commission Gives Conditional 
Approval to Business Consolidation of Microsoft and Nokia, BUSINESS 
KOREA (Feb. 6, 2015, 00:28), 
http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/politics/8925-ms-nokia-
merger-approved-korea-fair-trade-commission-gives-conditional-approval.  
28 Shangwu Bu (商务部) [China Ministry of Com.], Shangwu Bu Gonggao 
2014  Nian Di 24 Hao (商务部公告 2014年第 24号) [China Ministry of 
Com. Announcement No. 24 of 2014] 1, 8 (2014), 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/e/c/201404/20140400542508.shtml 
(China) [hereinafter MOFCOM Decision]; The Korea Fair Trade 
Commission (“KFTC”) Roots Out the Possibility of MS’s Abuse of Patent 
Rights, Korea Fair Trade Commission 1, 3–5 (Aug. 24, 2015), 
http://www.ftc.go.kr/solution/skin/doc.html?fn=47a731f026da112322e2a330
b7ffd350ff0c3dd0f93bb32e33d808d3bbeb66f1&rs=/fileupload/data/result/B
BSMSTR_000000002402/ [hereinafter KFTC Decision].  
29 MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28 at 8; KFTC Decision, supra note 28 at 
3, 5. 
30 MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28 at 8; KFTC Decision, supra note 28 at 
4. 
31 MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28 at 9–10; KFTC Decision, supra note 
28 at 5–6; Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (“TFTC”) Merger Case Decision 
No. 103001 at 1–2 (Feb. 19, 2014), 
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/uploadDecision/771dabc1-ec6b-4d37-acf7-
cf94f057427b.pdf (in Chinese) [hereinafter TFTC Decision]. 
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It is evident that a major difference between authorities in Eastern 
and Western nations lies in how they addressed the M&A participants’ 
patents. The East Asian countries were all particularly focused on 
patents and especially how they would be enforced after the 
acquisition.32 The Western jurisdictions, most notably the EU in its 
detailed decision, elected to downplay the merger’s impact on the 
patent license market.33 The scale and significance of the mobile device 
industry in various countries may have been a major factor influencing 
their respective decisions. For East Asian countries, smartphone 
companies represent larger shares of national economies than they do 
in the US or EU; thus, East Asian countries had more at stake in 
Microsoft’s venture into the smartphone market. 34  It is therefore 
natural that the East Asian authorities would scrutinize Microsoft and 
Nokia’s deal more closely than their EU and US counterparts and 
enforce their antitrust law in a manner that would protect a substantial 
portion of their domestic industry. Despite this common focus on their 
domestic economies, the various East Asian countries’ regulators 
reached different decisions because of historical and focal differences 
in competition regulations as well as their specific partitions of the 
general “mobile device industry”.35  
An “international competition law” has never been promulgated 
under the current World Trade Organization (“WTO”) regime. 36 
Without a binding global standard, each national government has the 
sovereign authority to protect its domestic market and tailor regulations 
to fit the local economy and industry policy.37 Through analysis of the 
Microsoft–Nokia merger case, this article attempts to illuminate how 
antitrust merger control regulations can be used to protect the 
development of local industry and still allow both investment in and 
access to the domestic market by MNCs. The argument herein is that 
when interfering with market function and scrutinizing M&A deals, 
 
32 See MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28 at 9–10; KFTC Decision, supra 
note 28 at 5–6. 
33 See EC Decision, supra note 23, at 17–18. 
34 See Richard Wray, How the Smartphone Made Europe Look Stupid, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2010, 19:06), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/feb/14/mobile-world-congress-
phones-networks. 
35 See Microsoft & Nokia v. Fair Trade Commission, 2015 SIFAYUAN 
JIANSUO XITONG 31–32 (Taipei High Admin. Ct. Jun. 25, 2015) [hereinafter 
THAC Adjudication]. 
36 See Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Promotes its State-Owned Enterprises 
at the Expense of Multinational Companies in China and Other Countries, 
41 N.C. J. INT'L L. 455, 456 (2016). 
37 See Andrew Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY 
J. INT'L L. 355, 355 (2004). 
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government antitrust agencies should broadly consider the balance of 
the domestic industry’s development, the benefit to local consumers, 
and the harm to foreign MNCs.38 Closely examining the Microsoft–
Nokia merger control case can help to clarify differences in national 
economies and domestic industries among these jurisdictions and 
policy motivations for the antitrust agencies’ merger control decisions. 
This article sequentially discusses the Microsoft–Nokia merger 
control decisions in China, South Korea, and Taiwan. Each discussion 
begins with a brief introduction to the competition law and its 
enforcement within each jurisdiction. The discussion then focuses on 
how each national antitrust agency determined the conditions to attach 
to the approval of the acquisition application. Finally, and of the most 
importance, the scope and intensity of restrictions imposed by each 
authority are compared as well as policy motivations for such 
restrictions. The final section is the conclusion. 
I.  MICROSOFT-NOKIA MERGER CONTROL DECISIONS 
A. Decision in China 
China enacted its Antimonopoly Law (“AML”) in 2008.39 At the 
time of Microsoft and Nokia’s proposed M&A, China had three 
government agencies responsible for AML enforcement: the National 
Development and Research Commission (“NDRC”), which addresses 
price-related monopolistic conduct, the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”), which enforces AML rules not 
related to price, and the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”), which 
oversees merger control.40 The following analysis is not affected by the 
fact that China subsequently consolidated its antitrust enforcement 
agencies into the State Administration for Market Regulation 
 
38 See Sergio Baches Opi, Merger Control in the United States and European 
Union: How Should the United States' Experience Influence the Enforcement 
of the Council Merger Regulation?, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 223, 225–
33 (1997). 
39 Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun & Wentong Zheng, China's Competition Policy 
Reforms: The Anti-Monopoly Law and Beyond, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 238 
(2008). Generally, the AML prohibits monopolistic conduct, including 
entering into anticompetitive agreements, abusing dominant market position, 
and engaging in M&As that may potentially eliminate or restrict 
competition. See also Salil K. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust 
Functionalism: Reconsidering China's Antimonopoly Law, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 
379, 396 (2009). 
40 Jillian Bray, Firmly Grasping the Knife: An Investigation of the 
Asymmetric Application of Chinese Antitrust Law as a Protectionist Tool, 24 
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 351, 366 (2016). 
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(“SAMR”), but it is relevant that the MOFCOM was the authority in 
charge of the case this articles focuses on.41 
The purpose of China’s AML, to some extent, differs from that of 
other countries’ competition laws. The general consensus is that the 
basic goals of antitrust law are to enhance economic efficiency and to 
safeguard consumer welfare. 42  As a part of antitrust enforcement, 
merger control should only aim to protect consumers by prohibiting 
M&As that are likely to create or enhance market power rather than 
reaching to serve broader policy goals such as public interest or 
industry development.43 By contrast, China’s AML states clearly that 
its purpose is to “promot[e] the healthy development of socialist market 
economy”.44 The term “socialist market economy” refers to China’s 
state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) and is an indication of the country’s 
public ownership.45 Thus, it is evident that in addition to promoting 
market-based competition, China drafted its AML to at least in part 
facilitate the pursuit of goals established by the Chinese Communist 
Party (“CCP”), one of which is bolstering its SOEs.46 The MOFCOM 
is instructed to consider the resulting influence on national economic 
development when evaluating proposed M&As.47  
M&A deals cannot be closed without approval by the MOFCOM 
if the deal participants exceed the turnover threshold set separately by 
the Provisions of the State Council on Thresholds for Prior Notification 
 
41 Miguel del Pino et al., International Antitrust, 53 YEAR IN REV. (ABA) 33, 
42 (2019). 
42 Andrew L. Foster, Navigating the Unique Features of China’s 
Competition Landscape, 31 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 80 (2017) (“Notwithstanding 
ongoing debate as to whether consumer welfare or total welfare should form 
the benchmark for the relevant economic welfare standard, most competition 
regulators accept that the basic goals of antitrust law are to enhance 
economic efficiency and safeguard consumer welfare.”). 
43 Id. 
44 Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 1 
(promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 




45 Daniel C.K. Chow, China's Enforcement of its Anti-Monopoly Law and 
Risks to Multinational Companies, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 99, 102–03 
(2016).  
46 Id.; See also Joanna Tsai & Yajing Jiang, Lessons from an Analysis of the 
Economic Approaches in China and the United States in Recent and Earlier 
Cross-Jurisdictional Merger Cases, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1117, 1123–24 
(2017). 
47 AML, supra note 44, art. 27(5). 
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of Concentrations of Undertakings. 48  These M&A participants are 
responsible for submitting a notification to the MOFCOM, which 
triggers a 30-day “Phase 1” initial merger review period after which it 
decides whether the notification is complete.49 The MOFCOM may 
extend the review period by 90 days (known as a “Phase 2” review), 
which may be extended by an additional 60 days if the participants 
agree.50  After review and investigation, the MOFCOM may either 
approve without conditions, impose certain restrictions, or block the 
transaction completely. 51 Although the MOFCOM has rarely 
intervened in M&A deals, these cases are especially important because 
they provide insight into when and how the MOFCOM steps in.52 
When the MOFCOM does opt to conditionally approve an M&A deal, 
behavioral conditions are imposed more frequently than structural 
ones.53  
In the Microsoft–Nokia acquisition case, Microsoft and Nokia 
filed a notification with the MOFCOM on 13 September 2013.54 The 
MOFCOM accepted the notification as complete and initiated a Phase 
1 review on 10 October 2013.55 The investigation extended into Phase 
2 on 8 November 2013 and was further extended for another 60 days 
on 8 February 2014. 56  The acquisition application was eventually 
approved by the MOFCOM on 8 April 2014.57 Because of the deal’s 
potential effect on the patent license market, the MOFCOM concluded 
that it had concerns regarding the potential anticompetitive effect of 
 
48 Id. arts. 21, 25, 26; Provisions of the State Council on Thresholds for Prior 
Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings (promulgated by the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China on Aug. 1, 2008 and effective 
Aug. 1, 2008), available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/c/200903/20090306071501.shtml.  
49 AML, supra note 44, art. 25. 
50 Id. art. 26. 
51 Id. arts. 28–29. 
52 See Cunzhen Huang & Fei Deng, Convergence with Chinese 
Characteristics? A Cross-Jurisdictional Comparative Study of Recent 
Merger Enforcement in China, ANTITRUST  44, 44 (2017). See also Fei Deng 
& Cunzhen Huang, A Ten-Year Review of Merger Enforcement in China, 
THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, 1, 1 (2018). 
53 Shaoping Chen, Merger Control Under China's Anti-Monopoly Law, 13 
CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. 177, 199 (2013). 
54 MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28, at 1. 
55 Id. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
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Microsoft’s Android license program (including both SEPs and non-
SEPs) and Nokia’s telecommunication SEPs.58  
The MOFCOM was first concerned that Microsoft would 
transform into a smartphone original equipment manufacturer 
(“OEM”) after the acquisition and thus would directly compete with 
Chinese domestic manufacturers, the vast majority of which produced 
Android phones.59 Microsoft would then have both the motivation and 
the power to raise royalty fees for its Android license program, 
containing key Android-related patents that would be virtually 
impossible for the Chinese domestic manufacturers to circumvent.60 
The acquisition would enable Microsoft to impose extra costs on its 
opponents or even provide it with the leverage necessary to require 
manufacturers to transform into production of devices using the 
Windows Phone operating system.61 For Nokia, the company would 
leave the smartphone manufacturing market and primarily retain its 
SEP licensing business.62 This suggested that Nokia would be inclined 
to raise its SEP royalty fees in search of profit and could do so without 
consequences because it would no longer need to obtain cross-licenses 
from its licensees.63  
The MOFCOM therefore decided to impose certain restrictions on 
both Microsoft and Nokia to preserve competition in the Chinese 
domestic patent license market. 64  The list of restrictions in the 
 
58 Id. at 5–6. The relevant markets in the case were the following: (1) 
smartphone (not including tablet), (2) mobile device operating system, and 
(3) mobile device patent license. The MOFCOM, in the merger control 
decision, did not think Microsoft’s acquisition of Nokia would disrupt the 
smartphone and operating system markets, given the miniscule market shares 
of Microsoft’s mobile device operating system and Nokia’s smartphone. Id. 
at 2–4. 
59 See Dominic Sunnebo, Android 87% Share in China; More Brands 
Competing, KANTAR WORLDPANEL (May 10, 2017), 1, 1–2, 
https://www.kantarworldpanel.com/global/News/Android-87-Share-in-
China-More-Brands-Competing. 
60 MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28, at 4–5.  
61 Id. 
62 See Dan Levine, Why Nokia Didn't Sell Its Patents to Microsoft, REUTERS 
(Sep. 4, 2013, 12:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nokia-
microsoft-patents/why-nokia-didnt-sell-its-patents-to-microsoft-
idUSBRE9820ZZ20130903. 
63 See MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28, at 5–7. 
64 See Elizabeth Xiao-Ru Wang, Patent Pledge Enforcement in China, in 
PATENT PLEDGES: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW’S PRIVATE 
ORDERING FRONTIER 197, 202–03 (Jorge L. Contreras & Meredith Jacob 
eds., 2017). 
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MOFCOM’s decision turned out to be extensive and onerous.65 With 
respect to Microsoft’s SEPs, Microsoft was required to (1) continue to 
adhere to the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) 
commitments it had made to standard setting organizations (“SSOs”), 
(2) not seek injunctive relief or exclusion orders against Chinese 
smartphone manufacturers, (3) not request that licensees license their 
patents to Microsoft in exchange (except for the licensees’ SEPs in the 
same standard), and (4) not transfer its SEPs to a party who refused to 
follow all of the above.66 As for Microsoft’s non-SEPs, the restrictions 
were also demanding. Microsoft had to (1) continue to offer 
nonexclusive licenses to Chinese smartphone manufacturers, (2) cap 
future royalty rates and license terms unrelated to price at the then-
current level, and (3) not transfer any of the non-SEPs to any other 
party until 5 years after the acquisition deal. 67  With respect to 
restrictions relating to its SEPs, Nokia also had to (1) continue to honor 
its FRAND commitments to SSOs, (2) not seek injunctive relief against 
good-faith potential licensees, (3) agree to use independent arbitration 
to solve FRAND disputes and be bound by the arbitrator’s decision, (4) 
not bundle or tie SEPs with other non-FRAND-committed patents to 
license, and (5) agree to never transfer its SEPs to a party refusing to 
honor FRAND commitments.68 
Overall, the restrictions imposed by the MOFCOM covered 
activities in both SEP and non-SEP license markets.69 Compared with 
unconditional approvals given by the US and EU, these restrictions 
seem onerous. This accords with the tendency of Chinese antitrust 
enforcement agencies to impose stricter conditions than their US and 
EU counterparts, especially where patent rights are concerned.70 The 
Chinese government increasingly uses antitrust law to address 
 
65 Although it appeared that the MOFCOM decided these terms unilaterally, 
a document published by Microsoft on its official blog indicates that the 
MOFCOM’s decision came as a result of some sort of negotiation with 
Microsoft and Nokia, albeit not through an “official” consent decree process. 
See Chinese Ministry of Commerce Approves Microsoft-Nokia Deal, 
MICROSOFT CORPORATE BLOGS (Apr. 8, 2014), 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2014/04/08/chinese-ministry-of-commerce-
approves-microsoft-nokia-deal/. 
66 MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28, at 7. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 8. 
69 Huang & Deng, supra note 52, at 47. 
70 Id. at 45.  
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perceived “monopolistic” practices in industries, particularly in the 
technology industry where SEPs are a major issue.71 
B. Decision in South Korea 
South Korea introduced its Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade 
Act (“MRFTA”) in 1980 and established the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission (“KFTC”) as its enforcing agency.72 Not unlike China’s 
AML, the MRFTA strives for “the balanced development of the 
national economy.” 73  It is apparent that promoting national policy 
plays a role in enforcement of MRFTA, although in traditional areas of 
antitrust enforcement, including merger control, it may not be as much 
of a priority as it is in China.74 MRFTA was voluntarily introduced 
without influence from other countries or organizations and with an 
aim to respond to public demand to counter the tyranny of chaebols 
and establish a well-functioning market economy in a time of political 
and economic turmoil.75 Enforcing MRFTA enables the KFTC to limit 
the dominance of chaebols and protect parties at a disadvantage such 
as consumers or small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”).76 The 
chaebols are mega corporate groups that are often established and 
owned by a single person or family.77 In the 1950s, the South Korean 
government decided that allowing a few select companies to freely 
expand into various industries was a shortcut to increasing exports and 
jobs.78 The government went so far as to explicitly provide the newborn 
 
71 Liyang Hou & Mengchi Tian, IPR Protection and Antitrust Regulation of 
SEPs in China, in SEPS, SSOS AND FRAND: ASIAN AND GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON FOSTERING INNOVATION IN INTERCONNECTIVITY 232, 
253–54 (Kung-Chung Liu & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2020). 
72 See Hwang Lee, Overview of Competition Policy, in CHINA-KOREA IP & 
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL REPORT 2017 VOLUME I 163, 164, 173 (Meng 
Yanbei & Lee Hwang eds., 2017). 
73 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (effective Dec. 31, 1980, as 
amended on Dec. 30, 1996). The purpose of the MRFTA also includes 
promoting fair and free competition, encouraging creative enterprising 
activities, and protecting consumers. Id. 
74 See Youngjin Jung & Seung Wha Chang, Korea's Competition Law and 
Policies in Perspective, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 687, 695 (2006).  
75 Lee, supra note 72, at 164. See also Kyu Uck Lee, Economic Development 
and Competition Policy in Korea, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 67, 70 
(2002). 
76 Lee, supra note 72, at 173. 
77 See Jeong Seo, Who Will Control Frankenstein? The Korean Chaebol's 
Corporate Governance, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 21, 23 (2006). 
78 Jingyuan Ma & Mel Marquis, Business Culture in East Asia and 
Implications for Competition Law, 51 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 13 (2016). 
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chaebols with benefits, such as cheap loans and relief funds. 79 
Chaebols that have dominated South Korea to this day include world-
class mobile device manufacturers Samsung and LG, which, as is 
explained later, may be of certain importance in the Microsoft–Nokia 
merger control decision. 
In the Microsoft–Nokia case, Microsoft and Nokia notified the 
KFTC of their M&A transaction on 1 November 2013.80 After the 
KFTC expressed concerns, Microsoft voluntarily proposed a remedy 
program on 27 August 2014, but it was deemed to be insufficient.81 The 
KFTC initiated a consent decree process on 4 February 2015, and the 
acquisition application was eventually approved on 24 August 2015, 
with Microsoft agreeing to an alternate remedy plan.82  
In the KFTC’s competition analysis, the sole relevant market was 
the patent license market comprising both smartphone and tablet 
patents.83 The KFTC’s main concern was that Microsoft “might abuse 
its patent rights against Korean smartphone manufacturers” upon 
becoming a device manufacturer itself through the acquisition.84 Stated 
differently, the risk was that while engaging in the device business, 
Microsoft might unilaterally raise license royalties or file patent 
lawsuits against its competitors to obstruct their businesses.85  
In fact, the restrictions the KFTC imposed on Microsoft were 
quite comparable to the MOFCOM’s aforementioned conditions, 
where both Microsoft’s SEPs and non-SEPs were addressed. 
 
79 See Christopher Hale, Addressing the Incentive for Expropriation Within 
Business Groups: The Case of the Korean Chaebol, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 
1, 27 (2006). 
80 KFTC Decision, supra note 28, at 1. 
81 Id. at 1–2. 
82 Id. at 1–7. 
83 Id. at 2. The KFTC also stated in its public notice that the geographic 
scope of its remedy plan included not only South Korea but also overseas 
markets because the plan sought to impose a limit on Microsoft’s ability to 
exercise patent rights in foreign jurisdictions. Id. In the same case, the 
MOFCOM had limited the scope merely to the Chinese domestic market. 
MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28, at 4. 
84 KFTC Decision, supra note 28, at 1. 
85 Id. However, the KFTC’s concern was not without criticism. Post-merger 
Microsoft might have little ability to raise its license royalties because major 
Android device manufacturers were said to have long-term license contracts 
with Microsoft; moreover, in reality Microsoft had weak incentives to raise 
its royalties because of the low popularity of Nokia’s smartphone (Lumia)—
Microsoft would minimally benefit from raising royalties demanded of 
Android device manufacturers. Sang-Seung Yi & Yoonhee Kim, Patent 
Pledges: Korean Perspectives, in PATENT PLEDGES: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON PATENT LAW’S PRIVATE ORDERING FRONTIER 209, 221 (Jorge L. 
Contreras & Meredith Jacob eds., 2017). 
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Microsoft’s SEPs were those related to communication technology, 
and its non-SEPs were those that consisted of core Android 
technologies, which the KFTC claimed were “practically impossible to 
replace or circumvent”.86 Regarding its SEPs, Microsoft agreed to (1) 
continue to honor its FRAND license commitments to SSOs, (2) not 
seek any SEP-based injunctive relief or exclusion orders against South 
Korean smartphone or tablet manufacturers, (3) not require SEP 
licensees to grant back their patents to Microsoft (except for the 
licensees’ SEPs essential to the identical standard), and (4) not transfer 
its SEPs to any party that did not agree to follow all of the above.87 As 
for its non-SEPs, Microsoft agreed to (1) continue to offer 
nonexclusive licenses to South Korean smartphone or tablet 
manufacturers, (2) keep royalty rates and non-pricing license terms no 
more demanding than before the acquisition, (3) offer a complete 
license package to South Korean manufacturers who were previously 
only partially covered, (4) not transfer these non-SEPs for 5 years, and 
(5) not seek non-SEP-based injunctive relief or exclusion orders 
against South Korean manufacturers whose license negotiations are in 
good faith.88 After conducting its investigation into what would remain 
of Nokia after the acquisition, the KFTC concluded that Nokia’s 
patents were “not merger-specific [and thus not] subject to the M&A 
investigation.”89 Ultimately, no obligation was imposed on Nokia by 
the KFTC, which was a quite different outcome from the severe 
restrictions imposed on Nokia’s patent license in China.90 
C. Decision in Taiwan 
Taiwan enacted its Fair Trade Act (“FTA”) in 1992, and it was a 
major and necessary step toward conformance with international trade 
practices.91 The Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (“TFTC”) was vested 
with power to enforce the FTA through various means, including 
competition investigations, imposition of sanctions, and, of course, 
 
86 KFTC Decision, supra note 28, at 3–4. Note that most of these patents 
were not South Korean patents. Jurata & Owens, supra note 3, at 1141. 
87 KFTC Decision, supra note 28, at 3. 
88 Id. at 4–5. 
89 Id. at 6. 
90 The KFTC mentioned at the end that it conducted a separate investigation 
into Nokia and would continue monitoring Nokia’s potential abuse of 
patents. Id. 
91 Pijan Wu & Caroline Thomas, Taiwan's Fair Trade Act: Achieving the 
‘Right’ Balance?, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 643, 645 (2006). 
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merger control.92 The FTA was not a purely domestic development but 
was strongly influenced by relevant statutes in the US, EU, and Japan.93 
The introduction of the FTA in Taiwan was not voluntary, and during 
the legislative process, numerous concerns were raised in the society. 
It took over 10 years to draft and finally implement the FTA.94 The 
most disputed aspects of the FTA were provisions and policies for 
stricter merger control, which possibly were in conflict with the 
government’s own policy of encouraging mergers; concerns were 
raised about delaying and hindering future M&As.95 To avoid delay 
and also alleviate administrative burdens, the TFTC amended its 
provisions in 2002 to adopt a “pre-merger notification system”; before 
the 2002 amendment, companies had to obtain its prior approval.96 In 
the current system, companies are required to notify the TFTC if a 
prospective M&A participant exceeds the market share or sales figure 
threshold.97 Within a certain period outlined in the FTA, the TFTC can 
opt to make a decision to either completely block or conditionally 
approve an M&A deal; otherwise, the companies can proceed with the 
deal.98 Conditional approval means the TFTC can attach conditions, 
including performing certain undertakings, to its approval decisions 
provided that the agency has anticompetitive concerns regarding a 
deal.99 These decisions, conditions, and undertakings can be appealed 
to administrative courts in Taiwan.100 
1. TFTC Decision 
In the Microsoft–Nokia case, Microsoft and Nokia filed a merger 
notification with the TFTC on November 20, 2013. 101  The TFTC 
issued its decision on February 19, 2014, which was earlier than the 
 
92 Fair Trade Act of 2017, arts. 6, 10–12, 26–28 (promulgated Feb. 4, 1991, 
amended Jun. 14, 2017), XIANXING FAGUI HUIBIAN, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=1295&docid
=15182. [hereinafter referred to as the Taiwan Fair Trade Act]. 
93 Wu & Thomas, supra note 91, at 664. 
94 See id. at 646. 
95 Id. at 646, 655. 
96 See id. at 656. 
97 Taiwan Fair Trade Act, supra note 92, art. 11.  
98 Id. 
99 Wu & Thomas, supra note 91, at 650; Taiwan Fair Trade Act, supra note 
92, art. 13. When deciding whether to completely block the transaction or to 
impose conditions or undertakings, the TFTC evaluates whether the overall 
economic benefit of the merger would outweigh the disadvantages that 
would result from competition restraint.  
100 Taiwan Fair Trade Act, supra note 92, art. 48. 
101 THAC Adjudication, supra note 35, at 2. 
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decisions of authorities in either China or South Korea.102 The TFTC’s 
restrictions on Microsoft’s and Nokia’s patent license practices were 
more moderate than those imposed on Microsoft by China or South 
Korea or those imposed on Nokia by China.103 The main concern of the 
TFTC was fairly similar to those of the MOFCOM and KFTC, namely 
that it would be possible for Microsoft to raise the license fees for its 
Android license program not for the relatively benign purpose of 
pushing mobile device manufacturers to select the less costly Windows 
Phone operating system but rather for the anticompetitive purpose of 
harming its new opponents in device manufacturing. 104  The TFTC 
contended that after acquiring Nokia’s DSB, Microsoft could possibly 
manufacture its own devices rather than rely on other manufacturers to 
do so. 105  Microsoft therefore might have an incentive to raise the 
Android licenses fees to raise rivals’ manufacturing cost.106 For Nokia, 
upon selling its DSB, the company would have the capability to 
increase its SEP license fees because it would no longer need to acquire 
cross-licenses from its licensees.107 Most notably, the TFTC indicated 
that the FTA had not excluded Nokia from its competition 
investigation, even though it had sold only some of its assets.108 The 
TFTC stated clearly in its decision that the agency opted to take a 
different stance from that of the EC regarding the inclusion of Nokia in 
the investigation.109  
The TFTC’s list of restrictions on Microsoft and Nokia was a very 
short one compared with that of the MOFCOM or the KFTC. The 
 
102 See TFTC Decision, supra note 31, at 10. 
103 See id. at 1–2. In the TFTC’s decision, the relevant markets were found to 
include mobile operating systems, mobile devices (both smartphones and 
tablets) and patent licensing for both, but the TFTC’s investigation and 
decision focused on the patent license market, which is the same with the 
MOFCOM’s and KFTC’s investigations. As for the geographic market, the 
TFTC limited the scope of its investigation to effects on the domestic 
market, which is the same as MOFCOM’s scope but different from that of 
the KFTC’s. See id. at 1–3. 
104 See id. at 5–7. The TFTC reasoned that because the Android and iOS 
ecosystems were both far more developed than the Windows Phone 
ecosystem, they were popular enough among consumers to ensure that 
manufacturers had little incentive to switch to Windows Phone, even if 
Microsoft demanded higher Android fees. Another group of Microsoft’s 
patents, those related to EAS technology, were not as readily exploitable 
because they were mostly already subject to long-term license agreements 
with fees that could not be altered unilaterally by Microsoft. See id. 
105 Id. at 6. 
106 TFTC Decision, supra note 31, at 6. 
107 Id. at 7. 
108 Id. at 7–8. 
109 Id. 
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TFTC simply ordered (1) Microsoft to not inappropriately price or 
discriminate when licensing its mobile device related patents to allow 
licensees to freely choose which operating system to incorporate into 
their devices, and (2) Nokia to continue licensing its SEPs according to 
FRAND principles and to not transfer SEPs to any party that did not 
agree to do so as well.110   
Despite fewer and less severe restrictions being imposed, the 
Microsoft–Nokia case was not yet over in Taiwan. The parties filed a 
petition appealing the TFTC’s restrictions at the Taipei High 
Administrative Court (“THAC”), which they would not do with respect 
to the later China and South Korea decisions.111 After the TFTC’s 
decision was upheld by the THAC, Nokia opted to appeal even further 
to the Supreme Administrative Court (“SAC”). The appeal was denied 
on August 3, 2016, and finally the case was resolved.112 Although the 
petition was unsuccessful, the THAC’s and SAC’s adjudication 
incorporated debates between the TFTC and Microsoft/Nokia and 
resulted in a more thorough exposition of the legal reasoning of the 
TFTC’s decision. 
2. THAC Adjudication 
Before the THAC, the merger-seeking parties argued that the 
TFTC failed to articulate why having a stronger ability to raise license 
fees would necessarily lead them to actually doing so and had relied on 
adverse testimony from fellow competitors and their own 
speculations.113 However, the THAC sided with the TFTC, finding that 
its collected evidence had been sufficiently examined without bias.114 
The THAC further indicated that because of the dynamic and uncertain 
nature of competition in the high-tech market, the TFTC may rely on 
evidence that is relatively lacking in clarity or specificity to justify its 
decision.115  
The parties also argued that the TFTC should have considered 
prior decisions in many other jurisdictions rather than only the later 
 
110 Id. at 2. 
111 See THAC Adjudication, supra note 35. 
112 Nokia v. Fair Trade Commission, 2016 SIFAYUAN JIANSUO XITONG (Sup. 
Admin. Ct. Aug. 3, 2016) [hereinafter SAC Adjudication]. 
113 See THAC Adjudication, supra note 35, at 6, 8–9. 
114 See id. at 34–41; Andy C. M. Chen, Patent Assertion Entities in Merger 
Review in Taiwan: Issues of Characterization and Remedies, PATENT 
ASSERTION ENTITIES AND COMPETITION POLICY 1, 4–5 (2017). 
115 Chen, supra note 114, at 4. However, the THAC’s adjudication and 
rationale were criticized for ambiguously refuting the argument that merger 
control was a process of “predicting” future market impacts. Id. 
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decisions in China and South Korea116—before the TFTC decision, the 
Microsoft–Nokia case had already been approved unconditionally in 
the US, EU, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Israel, Russia, and Ukraine.117 
However, the THAC in its adjudication elected to only refer to the later 
MOFCOM and KFTC decisions in China and South Korea, agencies 
which made the decisions after the TFTC and were the exceptions in 
imposing restrictions on either Microsoft or Nokia. 118  The THAC 
reasoned that Taiwan, China, and South Korea were home to mobile 
device manufacturers, which was not the case for the US, EU, and 
others, and consequently the antitrust authorities would likely make 
different merger control decisions. 119  Because the portion of the 
economy represented by mobile device manufacturing is substantially 
larger in East Asian countries than in Western or other countries, the 
effects of the Microsoft–Nokia acquisition in East Asia would 
presumably be larger.120 Therefore, the various East Asian countries’ 
antitrust authorities were more cautious and approved the acquisition 
only with certain restrictions imposed on the parties.121  
The THAC further noted that Taiwan’s mobile device 
manufacturers operated on the slimmest of profit margins and the 
competition among these manufacturers was intense.122 If the TFTC 
did not impose restrictions on merging entities in its approval, its 
divergence from the actions of the MOFCOM and KFTC might lead 
patentees to take advantage of the situation to raise their license fees in 
Taiwan to compensate for their losses in other East Asian areas.123 This 
would result in additional manufacturing costs and reduce the 
manufacturers’ profit, which would be harmful to Taiwan’s domestic 
manufacturers and reduce their competitiveness in the global market, 
particularly with respect to rivals from China and South Korea.124 This 
rationale not only justified the THAC’s adjudication referring to the 
MOFCOM and KFTC decisions but also rebutted Nokia’s argument 
that the TFTC should follow the EU’s example and not impose any 
restrictions on it. 
 
 
116 See THAC Adjudication, supra note 35, at 7, 9, 26–27, 32. 
117 Id. at 26. 
118 Id. at 26–27. 
119 Id. at 26. 
120 Id. at 26–32. 
121 See id. 
122 See THAC Adjudication, supra note 35, at 12, 31. 
123 See id. at 12. 
124 See id. at 12, 31. 
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3. SAC Adjudication 
Nokia was the only party to appeal to the SAC. Despite Nokia 
bringing up the EU and South Korean decisions as examples in its 
argument that it should be excluded from the competition investigation, 
the SAC held the same viewpoint as the THAC, which was to respect 
the TFTC’s full authority to make its own decisions according to 
Taiwan’s own competition law and environment.125 If examples were 
to be closely followed, then MOFCOM’s decision (where restrictions 
on Nokia were even more strict than those in Taiwan) had to be taken 
into consideration as well. 126  Nokia further argued that it was not 
necessary to order FRAND compliance because it had already made 
such commitments to SSOs. 127  The SAC rejected this argument, 
opining that FRAND commitments were not designed for M&A 
situations and did not contain provisions that prevent antitrust 
authorities from imposing restrictions.128  
The SAC also agreed with the THAC and TFTC that after selling 
its DSB, Nokia would no longer manufacture and sell mobile devices 
and its new business model would be built around licensing out 
patents. 129  Prior to the acquisition, Nokia and Taiwanese domestic 
manufacturers could “check-and-balance” each other because of their 
respective licensing and manufacturing needs.130 If Nokia were to raise 
license fees or change its license policy, Taiwanese manufacturers 
could retaliate likewise. 131  However, once Nokia no longer 
manufactures and sells mobile devices, the situation changes 
dramatically. Nokia could possibly become a so-called non-practicing 
entity (“NPE”), which profits by means of licensing patents.132 It would 
then practically be impossible for the Taiwanese manufacturers to 
“check-and-balance” Nokia given its market power based on its 
 
125 See SAC Adjudication, supra note 112, at 22, 25, 32–34. The SAC further 
stated that the decisions in the other jurisdictions did not have binding effect 
for the court and that these foreign decisions at most served to ‘support’ the 
court’s judgment. See id. at 34, 37. 
126 See id. at 34, 37. 
127 See id. at 26. This argument by Nokia was quite similar to the rationale of 
the EU decision in the same case. See EC Decision, supra note 23, paras. 
251–258. 
128 See SAC Adjudication, supra note 112, at 38-39. 
129 See id. at 40; THAC Adjudication, supra note 35, at 11, 35. 
130 See SAC Adjudication, supra note 112; THAC Adjudication, supra note 
35. 
131 See SAC Adjudication, supra note 112; THAC Adjudication, supra note 
35. 
132 See SAC Adjudication, supra note 112. 
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SEPs.133 The SAC ruled that the TFTC was justified in imposing the 
FRAND requirements on Nokia’s SEPs as a result. 
The SAC also discussed modern-era merger control, especially 
where the transaction involves patents. The SAC stated that intangible 
assets are undeniably of critical importance in merger control 
decisions.134 Thus, antitrust authorities should examine the merging 
parties’ patents, informational assets, and their effect on the domestic 
market. Even if a party (Nokia in this case) does not gain possession of 
any new patents, if its existing patents could be used in the market in a 
different manner, competition analysis is necessary. 135  The SAC 
further opined that competition analysis is based on prediction136—
epistemologically, how an M&A transaction will affect the market 
cannot be known beforehand.137 But, provided that authorities base 
their decisions on thorough research and convincing evidence, then 
such decisions should not be deemed arbitrary.138 
 
II. DECISION COMPARISON 
The Comparison of Microsoft–Nokia Merger Control Decisions 
table summarizes in sequence the Microsoft–Nokia merger control 
decisions as well as the final restrictions imposed on Microsoft’s and 
Nokia’s patents. 
 
133 See id. But it was commented that various rules or standards for 
characterizing NPE were necessary, if the court or agency examined the 
case’s competitive effect by means of the business-model transformation 
theory. Chen, supra note 114, at 20. 
134 See SAC Adjudication, supra note 112, at 32–33, 40. 
135 See id. at 33. 
136 Id. at 40–41. 
137 See id. at 41. 
138 See id. 
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Issuing its decision in February 2014, the TFTC in Taiwan was 
the first East Asian country to conditionally approve the case, followed 
by the MOFCOM’s decision in China and KFTC’s consent agreement 
in South Korea. 139  Of these, only the TFTC’s decision was later 
appealed to the administrative courts (the THAC and SAC) and subject 
to debate for over 2 years.140 During litigation in Taiwan, decisions by 
the China and South Korea agencies were cited by parties and taken 
under consideration by the courts.141 The TFTC’s conditional approval 
was not only the first one issued and only one appealed in East Asia 
but was also the last one affirmed in the world.142 Because neither 
Microsoft nor Nokia appealed in China, the MOFCOM’s conditional 
approval was the first to be affirmed in East Asia.143 South Korea was 
 
139 See MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28; see KFTC Decision, supra note 
28; see TFTC Decision, supra note 31. 
140 See MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28; see KFTC Decision, supra note 
28; see TFTC Decision, supra note 31. 
141 See, e.g., THAC Adjudication, supra note 35, at 32–33; SAC 
Adjudication, supra note 112, at 34. 
142 See Suk-yee, supra note 27.  
143 See Luke Hung-yu Chuang (莊弘鈺), Shiye Jiehe Guanzhi zhi 
Zhuanliquan Kaoliang Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan 105 Niandu Panzi di 403 
hao Panjue Pingxi (事業結合管制之專利權考量：最高行政法院 105年
度判字第 403號判決評析) [Patent Consideration in Merger Control: 
Comment on Nokia v. FTC], TAIWAN L.J. (台灣法學雜誌), no. 380 (2019). 
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the last of the three East Asian countries to make the merger control 
decision.144 After the TFTC’s and MOFCOM’s decisions in early 2014, 
the companies were probably aware that it was unlikely the KFTC 
would approve the same case without any restrictions. Microsoft 
therefore started to negotiate with and submitted its voluntary 
corrective proposal to the KFTC in August 2014; the consent 
agreement was reached in August 2015, which effectively resolved 
potential disputes. 145  The restrictions on Microsoft’s patents were 
similar in South Korea and China, indicating that the MOFCOM’s 
decision might have been highly influential on the KFTC’s consent 
agreement.  
As for restrictions on patents, the MOFCOM imposed severe 
restrictions on Microsoft’s and Nokia’s patents. Neither Microsoft nor 
Nokia could freely exercise their patent rights in China; for instance, 
they were limited in their abilities to file for injunctive relief, determine 
license rates and terms, and select assignees. The TFTC imposed 
relatively moderate restrictions on Microsoft’s and Nokia’s patents. 
Microsoft and Nokia were still permitted to seek injunctive relief and 
change license terms if the situation was appropriate, and Microsoft 
had much freedom to transfer its patents because of no period or 
assignee restraints. The KFTC’s restrictions were somewhere in the 
middle. As the MOFCOM had, the KFTC imposed extensive 
restrictions on Microsoft’s patents, particularly on Microsoft’s non-
SEPs; however, unlike the MOFCOM and TFTC, the KFTC imposed 
no restrictions on Nokia’s patents. Thus, Microsoft would have mostly 
the same restraints on its patent enforcement in South Korea and China, 
but Nokia would not be restrained in its patent enforcement in South 
Korea, unlike in China and Taiwan.  
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Intensity of Antitrust-Patent Regulation 
In the preceding sections, it was clear that regulatory 
considerations and eventual remedies revolved around Microsoft’s and 
Nokia’s patents. Whether it is appropriate to restrict patent rights 
through antitrust law and where boundaries should be set if so have 
 
144 See Jessica C. Wong, The Challenges Multinational Corporations Face in 
Protecting Their Well-Known Trademarks in China, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 
(2006). 
145 See KFTC Decision, supra note 28, at 1–2; Jinyul Ju, SEPS, SSOS AND 
FRAND: ASIAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON FOSTERING INNOVATION IN 
INTERCONNECTIVITY 212, 227 (Kung-Chung Liu & Reto M. Hilty eds., 
2020). 
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long been controversial questions.146 Some scholars have argued that 
antitrust law is necessary to prevent patent holdup, especially in the 
realm of SEPs, and it also ensures the effectiveness of FRAND 
commitments. 147  Others have taken the opposite approach and 
contended using antitrust measures to counter patent holdup is “a 
dangerous cure for an illusory disease”.148  
In China’s case, the MOFCOM apparently viewed the possibility 
of Microsoft and Nokia taking actions, such as seeking injunctive relief 
or setting more demanding license fees and terms, as crossing the line 
from “regular patent exercising” to anticompetitive behavior and thus 
intervened through merger control. Likewise, authorities in both South 
Korea and Taiwan demonstrated antitrust law in these jurisdictions can 
be used to control how patent owners exercise their rights. The 
principle reason, although contested in litigation in Taiwan, was that 
these East Asian countries are home to many mobile device 
manufacturers; therefore, the three antitrust authorities had to take their 
domestic industry development into account. 149  If one of these 
authorities was more passive in enforcing its country’s antitrust law 
while the others were more active, that country would be at risk for 
patent owners shifting the pressure to their domestic licensees, 
claiming more license fees and compensating for their losses in the 
other countries. 150  Stated differently, these East Asian countries 
possess largely similar industry environments and to some extent 
compete with each other; thus, having manufacturing or licensing costs 
deviate too much from others could damage competitiveness and the 
domestic industry. The three antitrust authorities seemed to adopt a 
similar stance for this reason, all intervening in the Microsoft–Nokia 
transaction and eventually conditionally approving the case.151 
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The willingness to enforce antitrust law was similar among the 
East Asian countries, but the intensity of the enforcement action varied. 
With regard to Microsoft in this case, for instance, China and South 
Korea both required that Microsoft comply with numerous 
requirements, but Taiwan was more restrained in its approach. 152 
Notably, China and South Korea both explicitly ordered the 
continuation of FRAND licensing, whereas Taiwan did not. This 
suggests that Chinese and South Korean authorities may be more 
inclined to view FRAND requirements as a powerful tool to check SEP 
owners.153 
The disparity in strictness also likely had to do with the fact that 
the TFTC had fewer prior examples to reference because it was one of 
the first to decide whether to approve the M&A with certain 
restrictions. This disparity also reflected differences in the three 
authorities’ determination to safeguard its respective country’s mobile 
device industry. In China’s case, companies such as Huawei, Xiaomi, 
and Oppo together held a growing share of the global smartphone 
market. 154  It was therefore likely that protecting this industry was 
among the CCP’s policy goals,155 and this had a strong influence on the 
MOFCOM’s decisions. In South Korea, though its world-class 
companies Samsung and LG are both chaebol, which the government 
should be inclined to restrain, the mobile device industry represents a 
 
physical products over the market for patent licensing. But not much can be 
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major sector of the South Korean economy; thus, Microsoft could not 
be allowed to freely enter the market and take a share.156 Samsung’s 
concern that Microsoft might raise its 76 at-issue SEPs for the Android 
system was given a relatively high amount of weight by the KFTC 
despite minimal support being offered for this proposition.157 Taiwan 
is a relatively small country with a complicated diplomatic status and 
a developed mobile device industry.158 The TFTC is in a very different 
position than its equivalents in the US, EU, and even East Asia.159 
Taiwan was not anticipated to possess enough bargaining clout among 
the international community to enforce its antitrust law; therefore, the 
TFTC realistically could not impose extensive restrictions in its 
conditional approval compared with the MOFCOM and KFTC in 
China and South Korea. 
B. Approaches to Post-Acquisition Nokia 
Nokia, which sold off part of its business and became smaller and 
seemingly less powerful after the acquisition, was treated quite 
differently by the jurisdictions. The Merger Regulation of the EU was 
construed to exclude Nokia from the competition investigation, finding 
that it was not part of the “merged entity” because it would in fact lose 
a part of its business.160 Taiwan’s TFTC and administrative courts held 
that Nokia’s change in market position, business strategy, and 
bargaining power would be the direct result of the transaction and thus 
were merger-specific, but the TFTC imposed only light restrictions on 
Nokia. 161  China was more proactive in restraining post-acquisition 
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Device Business by Microsoft (Dec. 4, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-1210_en.htm. Note that despite this, the EC was careful to 
provide further reasoning, stating that Nokia’s SEPs were already subject to 
SSO FRAND conditions and the non-SEPs were already in force and thus 
not merger specific. See EC Decision, supra note 23, paras. 252–63. 
161 The restrictions only required Nokia to continue its FRAND 
commitments and to transfer its SEPs to assignees with the same 
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continue its FRAND commitments. TFTC Decision, supra note 31, at 2. Yet, 
some American cases even held that although the SEPs were transferred, the 
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Nokia, judging from its list of restrictions imposed on the company, 
which was not much shorter than its list of restrictions on Microsoft.162  
The MOFCOM justified its unique treatment of Nokia by 
reasoning that Nokia’s business model would shift to an SEP-licensing 
orientation; thus, it could arbitrarily raise licensing fees in search of 
profit. China and Taiwan might have had the same concern that Nokia 
would transform into an NPE, a concern made even more evident 
during litigation at the SAC in Taiwan.163 China and Taiwan were thus 
the only two regimes in the world to impose restrictions on Nokia. As 
mentioned before, Taiwan was presumably cognizant of its special 
diplomatic status and relatively weak bargaining power in the 
international community, which may likely have been a factor in their 
treatment towards MNCs and their patents. If the MOFCOM had not 
taken a similar stance and imposed even more severe restrictions in 
China, the TFTC might have lost its support in the global business 
world and then would have eventually withdrawn its decision or settled 
the case in the courts in Taiwan. 
The KFTC’s decision was the last one made among the three 
antitrust authorities, which means the Microsoft–Nokia acquisition had 
already been subject to considerable discussion and debate in South 
Korea.164 The KFTC did not concur with the TFTC’s and MOFCOM’s 
decisions to restrict Nokia and opined that Nokia’s patents were not so 
“merger-specific” as to call for competition investigation.165 Despite 
initiating a separate investigation into Nokia and continuing to monitor 
Nokia’s potential patent abuse, the KFTC undertook no further 
proceedings and imposed no restrictions on Nokia in the end.166 One 
possible reason for this result was that the KFTC did not believe that 
the acquisition would necessarily transform Nokia into an NPE.167 In 
fact, Nokia did continue operating some business units and even 
 
FRAND commitments were binding on new assignees. See, e.g., Core 
Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 899 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
The aforementioned TFTC’s two restrictions on Nokia thus appears to be 
redundant. 
162 See MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28.  
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166 See id. 
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judgment in Taiwan were somewhat questionable. See Chen, supra note 114, 
at 4–5, 20. 
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launched new products after the acquisition, and consequently 
classifying Nokia as an NPE would not be entirely accurate.168 The 
South Korean patent remedy system was not suitable for Nokia to use 
to become an NPE; although the courts could still give protection to 
patent owners through infringement damages and injunctive relief, the 
scale and impact were well below those of the US and EU.169 Another 
possible reason for imposing no restraint on Nokia was to ensure South 
Korean domestic manufacturers, primarily Samsung and LG, did not 
receive excessive protection. Because Samsung and LG are two of the 
most dominant chaebol in South Korea, offering too much support to 
chaebol would have not only been harmful to the government’s public 
image but also detrimental to South Korea’s market competition, which 
is one of the reasons why South Korea’s MRFTA was enacted in the 
first place.170 
C. Following Appeals and Lawsuits 
In China, South Korea, and Taiwan, the Microsoft–Nokia 
acquisition was cleared under certain conditions. Despite those 
conditions being far less severe in Taiwan than in the other two 
countries, the only appeals in any country were filed against the 
decision of Taiwan’s antitrust authority. One of the reasons may have 
been that at the time, the majority of the global antitrust authorities 
approved the Microsoft–Nokia M&A without imposing any conditions 
or restrictions, making the TFTC a notable exception and the first to 
issue such a conditional approval. In this view, it was reasonable for 
Microsoft and Nokia to appeal to administrative courts. The THAC 
sided with the TFTC, and Nokia was the only party to appeal to the 
SAC, possibly because Microsoft realized that the restrictions it faced 
in Taiwan were much more moderate than those it faced in China and 
South Korea. Additionally, Microsoft’s and Nokia’s appeals also 
reflected the controversial and conflicting merger policy in Taiwan. 
The TFTC’s merger control might sometimes be cumbersome and 
cause delay, but the government is usually active in promoting mergers 
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and amending regulations such as the Business M&A Law and the 
Company Law to liberalize Taiwan’s industry.171 The petition to the 
administrative courts might also have helped to clarify the 
government’s ambiguous policy regarding merger control. Finally, 
again due to its unique international status, Taiwan does not have a 
strong position from which to enforce its antitrust law against MNCs; 
therefore, Nokia’s or Microsoft’s petition might best be viewed as a re-
bargaining process between the TFTC and MNCs in court. 
It is understandable why judicial relief was not sought in China. 
Though China’s legal system appears to offer means of appeal or 
seeking relief, effective recourse is de facto nonexistent if a party is 
dissatisfied with the MOFCOM’s decision regarding an M&A deal.172 
Corporations might fear retribution by the Chinese government, as the 
government has the power to interfere with their investment projects 
and otherwise make business difficult.173 Virtually, all enforcement 
authorities and channels of relief are also controlled by the same 
entity—the CCP. 174  It is therefore questionable whether an 
independent judiciary can be realized under the Chinese regime.175 
With courts and appellate systems having difficulty deviating from the 
administrative decisions by the MOFCOM—decisions of the CCP 
itself, relief attempts are likely to be in vain and may even backfire on 
the petitioning party. 
For South Korea, the KFTC’s decision was preceded by a consent 
decree process, which implied that Microsoft, at least to some extent, 
had negotiated with the KFTC about its remedy options, thus putting 
Microsoft in a more difficult position to disagree with the final 
decision.176  In fact, the KFTC’s decision came even later than the 
TFTC’s and the MOFCOM’s decisions in Taiwan and China 
respectively. It is possible that upon seeing how the case developed in 
jurisdictions with an industry environment similar to South Korea’s, 
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Microsoft did not anticipate receiving a merger control approval 
without any restrictions or conditions. Additionally, the THAC issued 
its adjudication opinion 2 months before the KFTC’s decision, which 
might also have caused Microsoft to not feel optimistic about its 
chances of success in the South Korean courts. The last possible reason 
for not seeking judicial relief in South Korea is that Microsoft’s 
acquisition of Nokia gradually turned out to be a “monumental 
mistake”, which was already apparent by the time the deal was finally 
approved in South Korea. 177  This provided little incentive for 
Microsoft to pursue full implementation of the deal. 
CONCLUSION 
In the absence of an international competition regulation or 
standard, each national antitrust agency is free to make its own merger 
control decisions on the basis of the needs of its local economy and 
industry policy. It was illustrated in the article that while most countries 
imposed no restraints when approving the Microsoft–Nokia acquisition 
application, there were three exceptions. China’s MOFCOM imposed 
severe restraints on both Microsoft and Nokia, demonstrating the 
Chinese government’s aim to protect its booming local industry. The 
KFTC imposed constraints comparable to those of the MOFCOM’s on 
Microsoft but not on Nokia, implying that the South Korean 
government was cautious to enforce its antitrust policy to preserve its 
own industrial innovation and balance. Despite Taiwan having limited 
bargaining power in the international community, its TFTC 
nevertheless imposed mild restraints on Microsoft and Nokia in what 
might be called a bold pioneering decision in East Asia—it was even 
the only decision worldwide that was appealed to a country’s highest 
court. This comparative study illustrated the different stances Western 
and Eastern countries may have regarding whether or not to interfere 
with market operations through competition regulation. Most notably, 
Eastern countries have a different regulatory intensity and scope 
driving their considerations to intervene in market competition. 
Competition regulation is never done in isolation from other factors, 
and each country’s competition decision is indeed tailored to its 
respective economic and political concerns. 
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